Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Chile by Jere H. Behrman
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Chile





Chapter Title: Economic Growth
Chapter Author: Jere H. Behrman
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c4035
Chapter pages in book: (p. 268 - 292)Chapter 12
EconomicGrowth
InChile, as elsewhere in the developing world, growth has been a high-priority
objective. The focus of this chapter, therefore, is on questions such as the fol-
lowing: To what extent has growth been associated with the degree of liberali-
zation? How has it been affected by devaluation and liberalization? How have
foreign-sector policies affected each of these factors?
Exploration of these questions leads to the identification of a number of
associations between the Chilean international economic regimes and growth
factors. More restrictive regimes, for example, have tended to lessen growth by
encouraging inefficient shifts of primary factors among subsectors, inducing
technology too capital-intensive for the Chilean economy with its large num-
bers of unskilled workers, reducing domestic savings, increasing marginal
capital-output ratios, limiting the importation of embodied technology, pro-
hibiting the importation of second-hand equipment, discouraging the expansion
of command over foreign resources through increased exports, discriminating
against the development of linkages, and encouraging plants of less than opti-
mal scale. There have been some counterbalancing effects, but they appear to
have been much smaller in magnitude. No evidence was found, moreover, that
productivity has increased relatively in the more protected industries. The net
impact of restrictionism on growth, thus, appears to have been negative.
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the absolute size of
this growth effect has not been very large insofar as a judgment can be made
based on a statistical analysis of Chilean experience. In part, the smallness of
the effect reflects the canceling out of opposing responses. In part it may also
be an effect of basing the analysis on a historical period of disequilibrium in
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which expectations that any liberalizing attempt would fail were soon fulfilled.
Under such conditions, adjustments related to growth might be quite slow. Per-
haps much larger responses would occur if expectations of a longer-run liberali-
zation could be created. But this is very speculative. And to do so would be
very difficult given the repeated failures of the past.
12.1 OVER-ALL GROWTH RATES
In this section time-series and cross-sectional evidence are brought to bear on
the question of the association between foreign-sector policy and economic
growth. Then the effects of devaluation and liberalization within the structural
general-equilibrium model are considered.
12.1.1Time-Series Evidence.
The mean growth rates of real GDP per capita for phases and subphases
are given in Table A. 1 (line 5.1). The highest values are for recent phases (6.0
per cent for 1971, 2.5 per cent for 1965—70, and 1.6 per cent for 1962—64)
1- and the Second World War subphase (2.2 per cent). This pattern suggests a
i- positive secular trend, with fluctuations depending in part on the state of world
markets. The pre-Great Depression average (1.5 per cent for 1908—27), how-
ever, is higher than those of all subsequent phases and subphases except for the
four mentioned above. On the face of it, therefore, the historical record does
•.h not support the claim of the structuralists that restrictionism leads to higher
growth rates.
—ig Focusing on the more recent phases reinforces this last point. The Phase
II periods following the Second World War had the highest (6.0 per cent for
19711) and the lowest (0.9 per cent for 1952—55) mean growth rates in real
per capita GDP. For the more liberal periods the mean values have been in
51 between: 1.4 per cent for 1956—58, 1.2 per cent for 1959—61, and 2.5 per cent
for 1965_70.2 The increase in the mean growth rate for 1956—58 to the highest
level between the Second World War and 1962—64 is of particular interest be-
:0 cause one of the major criticisms of the structuralist school has been that the
at Ibañez-Klein-Saks stabilization efforts caused stagnation.3 Therefore, Ffrench-
et Davis [1971:245] suggests that the 1957 national accounts must be overesti-
mates because they imply a growth of real GDP per capita of 5.2 per cent.
Unfortunately, he is not specific in his evidence, nor is he clear as to whether
he thinks the rate of growth also is underestimated in the national accounts in
1956 or 1958 or in some other year because of what he considers to be an
• error. Without specific evidence to the contrary, however, it seems reasonable
to conclude that significant real growth did occur in this period despite the
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claims of many critics of the stabilization program. But it is also relevant to
note that as a result of such growth, the level of per capita real GDP only re-
turned to about the 1953 level.
In the first years after the Second World War, a number of economists in
Chile and elsewhere in Latin America placed great emphasis upon the role of
deteriorating terms of trade in the retardation of growth. The question naturally
arises, therefore, whether or not there is any evidence of a positive association
between Chile's terms of trade and her rate of growth. Examination of the data
in lines 1.1.5.1 and 5.1 in Table A.l prima facie leads to some skepticism about
this hypothesis. In only three of the seven phases and subphases between 1931
and 1964 were movements in the mean terms of trade in the same direction as
changes in the mean per capita growth rate (but see subsection 12.1.3, below).
Deviations from the secular growth rates for real GDP and for capacity
provide further insight into the relation between growth and phases of restric-
tionism in the foreign-sector regime (Table A.2). For real GDP significantly
negative deviations occurred for 1956—58 and 1959—61. For capacity a sig-
nificantly negative deviation (but only at the 40 per cent level) results for
1959—61. These deviations do notimplythat growth was lower in those two
more liberalized periods than in the previous Phase II years. To the contrary,
as noted above, on the average growth was higher. What they do imply is that
growth tended to decline during those two more liberal phases. Those decelera-
tions undoubtedly contributed to the failure of the efforts at stabilization plus
liberalization.
12.1.2Cross-Sectional Evidence.
The subsectoral estimates of protection and DRCs in Table 5.3 can be
used to explore the extent of association between the price structures created
by the international economic regimes and sectoral growth. Table A.5 contains
all significantly nonzero correlations between ITR, EPR, and DRC measures
and each of the following sets of measures of growth: (i) rates of growth of
product between 1953 and 1961; (ii) rates of growth of gross product and of
value added between 1957 and 1962; (iii) rates of growth of gross product,
value added, total capital, and capacity in horsepower terms between 1957 and
1967; and (iv) rates of growth of gross product and of value added between
1962 and 1967. Table A.6 contains all significantly nonzero correlations be-
tween changes in ITRs and EPRs. in 1961—67 and the same sets of growth
measures.
The resultant data lend some support to the hypothesis of a positive rela-
tion between protection levels or changes and growth.4 ITRs for 1967 are 5
positively correlated with growth in value added and in horsepower capacity
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positively associated with the same two variables, as well as with growth in
product between 1953 and 1961. These results may be somewhat puzzling be-
cause it is hard to understand why within a neoclassical model ITRs (as op-
posed to EPRs) should be related to relative growth. Perhaps they served as
F signals, however, of the government's intentions to favor particular subsectors.
For the EPRs, and for DRC1, however, there is no evidence of a positive
• association with growth. The only significantly nonzero correlation coefficient,
• in fact, is a negative one between EPR2 and the growth in product between
1953 and 1961. The available empirical evidence thus suggests that ITRs may
have been positively associated with capacity allocation—but not EPRs.5
12.1.3General-EquilibriumAnalysis.
The analyses in the two previous subsections are limited because no
means is provided for guaranteeing the maintenance of ceteris paribus assump-
tions. This lack is filled by the general-equilibrium model of Chapter 2.
For the investigation of growth effects, however, one important reservation
concerning use of this model must be made clear: 6thebehavioral relations in
the model were estimated from a sample period during which overvaluation
and fluctuations of policy were substantial. Perhaps such a history created ex-
• pectationsof failure for any liberalization efforts and thus greatly limited
growth-related responses. If disequilibrium were eliminated in a credible way,
a substantial change might result in the relevant parameters. The Chilean expe-
rience does not provide data to test such a hypothesis. However, Bhagwati
[1975] and Krueger [1975] explore this possibility in the summary volumes
for this project by comparing experiences in various countries. For Brazil in
—
particular,the work of Fishlow [1975] suggests support for this hypothesis.
If this hypothesis is true for Chile, the present model underestimates growth•
responses. To make any attempt at stabilization plus liberalization sufficiently
credible in Chile, however, would be very difficult indeed because of the failure
of four stabilization efforts and three liberalization attempts in less than two
decades. A radical break with past policies and some important short-run sue-
cesses might be required to establish credibility.
Subject to this qualification, several conclusions based on selected simula-
tions in Table A.!! can be drawn:
Simulation 1.1 gives the impact of an increase in the terms of trade due to
a proportional increase in all export prices and unit values in the first year only.
After some time for adjustment (i.e., in the third year) the elasticity of capacity
•
- isnot significantly different from zero, but that of GDP is 0.1 (lines 5.3 and
e 5.1). The response of investment in the third year (line 5.3.1) does cause an
• increase in capacity by the fourth year. Under ceteris paribus conditions,
e therefore, changes in the terms of trade do have a significant impact on growth.272 IMPACT OF FOREIGN-SECTOR REGIMES
Contrast this result with the lack of apparent association noted in subsection
12.1.1 above.
In simulation 2.1.1, it is assumed that there are equal proportional devalu-
ations in all legal NERs in the first year only. In simulation 2.1.3 the Bacha-
Taylor equilibrium NER is assumed for all years. In both cases even the third-
year elasticity of capacity is not large. In the first case the third-year elasticity
of GDP is 0.1. In the second case, this translates into a 4 per cent increase in
GDP. Whether such a product increase is large or small is a matter of defi-
nition. Given the required devaluations for the Bacha-Taylor equilibrium rates
(i.e., 45, 35, and 61 per cent), the growth gain is smaller than many advocates
of devaluation seem to suggest. On the other hand, such an increment clearly
is significant and is desirable, ceteris paribus.
Simulation 2.3.1 gives the consequences of a change in quantitative re-
strictions in the first year only. The third-year elasticities indicate that liberali-
zation would have an insignificant impact on capacity, but a negative effect on
GDP. As in a number of cases discussed in previous chapters, therefore, lib-
eralization tends to offset some of the effects of devaluation.
Thus, the impact of changes in the foreign sector on GDP may be signifi-
cant. Subject to the qualifications made above, however, the response of Ca-
pacity is quite small. The impact on GDP is primarily due to variations in
capacity utilization. Even these reactions, moreover, require several years to
work out. Unless a liberalization program did indeed Change some of the pa-
rameters of the system, therefore, the growth consequences would only begin
to appear after a couple of years. Unless the government had some successes in
regard to other macro objectives, history suggests that it would be difficult
to maintain momentum until the growth effects became evident.
12.2 AN AGGREGATE PRODUCTION
FUNCTION
In this section, the effect of foreign-sector policies on major growth factors is
examined within the framework provided by an aggregate production function.
Consider capacity to be determined by the quantity and quality of labor, the
quantity and quality of capital, the quantity of natural resources, and the quan-
tity of foreign factors available.
The designation of these factors as separate inputs depends upon the
limited substitution among them. Limited substitution is not the same as no
substitution, however. The empirical evidence summarized in Behrman [1972a
and 1972b] suggests that considerable substitutionmay be technically possible
among some of these factors. To the extent that considerable substitution is tECONOMIC GROWTH 273
possible, no single factor will, strictly speaking, be an absolute bottleneck
11 within reasonable policy horizons.
•
L Therate of growth of output within this framework is the weighted sum of
the rates of growth of those factors. The weight for each factor is the elasticity
• of output with respect to that factor. If there are constant returns to scale and




ly If factor shares even roughly approximate the weights described above
for the determination of growth, changes in the effective labor force are of sub-
stantial importance.7
Foreign-sector policies have significantly influenced the quantity of labor
utilized through their impact on capacity utilization and on factor proportions
(see sections 9.2 and 11.1). There probably also has been an effect on labor
participation, perhaps transmitted through the unemployment rate. The dis-
fi- cussionin previous chapters suggests that, in the long run, liberalization and
a- devaluationmight increase the size of the labor input.8 Because of adjustment
J
problems,however, the short-run consequences probably would be in the
•to opposite direction.
a- Theimportation and exportation of labor services have not been very im-
portant in purely numerical terms. Chile long has provided some professionals
Ifl for work elsewhere and has utilized professionals and technicians from other
countries in her own economy. In comparison to the total work force, the num-
bers involved have always been quite small.
12.2.2Quality of Labor
Harberger and Selowsky [1966] present a Denison-like calculation of the
is source of Chilean growth. For the postwar period they attribute a substantial
proportion of total growth to improvements in Chilean human capital. Selow- p
ie sky and. Taylor [1973] estimate that the return to investment in nutrition for
Chilean infants is very high. These results suggest that the quality of labor is
quite important in Chilean development. Extensive attempts to utilize the Har-
berger and Selowsky human capital series in econometric estimates for the
IC) Chilean economy, however, do not result in significant statistical support for
• the importance of this factor, perhaps because of problems of aggregation or
He because in generating their series, they arbitrarily attribute all wage differentials
• to education.
V
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Despite the lack of success in finding statistical support for the role of the
quality of the labor force in Chilean development, this factor probably has
been important in the growth process and has been affected by international
economic regimes in at least five important ways.
i. The effect of more restrictive regimes generally has been to encourage
or require importation or training of skilled labor or both for some of the in-
dustries which have developed behind trade barriers.
ii. The AJiende foreign trade regime, however, had the opposite effect in
the short run. Many skilled professionals and technicians, both Chilean and
foreign in nationality, left the country in part because of changes in economic
policy. To be' more specific, the nationalization of some foreign industries and
limitations on the extent to which wages and salaries could be paid in dollars
both caused net outflows of highly skilled individuals. The latter change may
have been an important factor, in fact, in the failure of copper production to
expand as rapidly as programmed (see subsections 4.2.1 and 7.1.2.3).
iii. Foreign-sector policies encouraged some sectoral and subsectoral
shifts of labor which were socially inefficient. While strictly speaking the qual-
ity of labor is not diminished by these shifts, in the aggregate the effect appears
to be the same as a lessening of quality. The most obvious example of this has
been the utilization of skilled labor by the government to maintain restrictive
regimes and by the private sector to attempt to circumvent them. Restrictive
regimes also have encouraged shifts from mining to industry (see subsection
10.1.1), which apparently have been from a high to a lower marginal labor
productivity sector.°
iv. Some advocates of more restrictive regimes claim that barriers
will permit development of native entrepreneurs and increases in labor produc-
tivities through learning by doing. Evidence to support these claims is difficult
to find. The relatively low and stagnant productivities in the traditional import-
substitution subsectors alluded to in Chapter 10, for example, if anything sug-
gest the opposite conclusion.'0 Restrictive barriers may have primarily lessened
pressures for increased efficiency and productivity that the international market
otherwise would have provided.
v. To the extent that foreign-sector policy affects nutrition in the lower
income classes by altering the income distribution, the Selowsky and Taylor
[1973] results suggest the possibility of considerable impact on the quality of
labor in the long run. If an upward shift in the labor share of income is highly
correlated with an increase in lower-class income,'1 then, as was suggested
in section 11.1, in the short and medium run restrictionism has a positive
• effect on the quality of labor through this mechanism. It is implied in that
same section, however, that the results may be in the opposite direction in the
• longer run.
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e 12.2.3Quantity of Capital.
Research of the past decade has raised strong doubts about earlier claims
for the almost absolute primacy of capital bottlenecks in the growth process.12
e Nevertheless,additions to the effective capital stock remain a major factor in
the growth of capacity. If factor shares roughly approximate the appropriate
- weightsin the growth accounting mentioned at the start of this section, for
example, changes in the effective capital stock are weighted second only to
those of the effective labor force in over-all growth.13 On a per capita basis, the
growth of the effective capital stock has the highest weight of any factor.
12.2.3.1INVESTMENT.
Since World War II, slightly more than 10 per cent of GDP has been ac-
counted for by investment (Table A.l, line 3.1.2.2).14 The secular growth rate
of investment has been higher than that for GDP, but not enough substantially
to alter this ratio.'5 No significant phase associations are evident in either the
share of investment in product or the secular growth rate of investment.'5
.'is A significant relation between the foreign sector and real investment
nevertheless seems likely. It is emphasized in subsection 5.1.2 that, on the
average, international economic regimes have favored investment-goods im-
ye ports over consumption goods.'7 This favoritism contrasts sharply with the
experience of Chile's neighbor, Argentina. For that country DIaz [1965] esti-
mates that because of the high protection given domestic capital goods pro-
ducers, a 25 per cent savings rate results in investment of only 14 per cent of
is GNP when evaluated at world prices. For Chile the changein the opposite
direction because the protection given domestic capital goods producers is
relatively low. The share of investment in GNP for 1947—71 is 11 per cent at
domestic prices, and 17 per cent at world prices.'8 In the late 1960s, however,
as is concluded in section 5.2, protection did increase relatively for domestic
capital goods production.
et In subsection 5.1.2, it is also suggested that even though on average in-
vestment imports were favored over other import categories, at times of crisis
this import category was the one must severely restricted because investment
was deemed relatively postponable. The result was that relative fluctuations in
of the PLD-EER(PI) for this category exceeded those in any other category.
In subsection 6.1.2 and section 6.2 a detailed examination is made of the
pd impact of the PLD-EER(PI) for capital goods on imports of such goods. Their
re share increased secularly, but responded substantially to variations in quanti-
• tative restrictions. The relative size of the imported component of investment,
thus, also tended to increase over time, but with substantial variations (line
• 1.2.2.2 in Table A. 1). The very size of the imported share of investment, from276 IMPACT OF FOREIGN-SECTOR REGIMES
about 20 to 40 per cent even in domestic prices, also points to the importance
of the foreign sector in the investment process.
Statistical Evidence A bout the Foreign Sector and Investment.Tables
A.5 and A.6 include all significantly nonzero correlations between the levels
and rates of change of the subsectoral measures of protection shown in Table
5.3, on the one hand, and various measures of capital intensity, on the other.
EPRs in 1967 were significantly higher for the industries which a decade
earlier had been relatively capital-intensive and in which machinery and equip-
ment had dominated in the composition of capital (but less so over time). The
rise in EPRs between 1961 and 1967 also was significantly higher in the in-
dustries which in 1957 were more capital-intensive, but in which the impor-
tance of machinery and equipment in the composition of capital had declined.19
Both the levels and the rates of rise of EPRs, thus, were correlated with
earlier capital intensities. However, the direction of causality is not completely
clear. The capital intensities may have been higher because of long-ongoing
protection, in which case protection restricted economic growth by encouraging
utilization of too much scarce capital in the highly protected industries (also
see section 9.1). The more capital-intensive industries, moreover, may have
t.. beenable to assure increasing EPRs over time because of the political power
they were able to wield on the strength of their large holdings of assets.
ITRs in 1967 and the increase in ITRs between 1961 and 1967 both were
associated with the increase in horsepower capacity between 1957 and 1967.
These patterns provide some further support for the associations between
capital intensity and protection which are discussed in the previous paragraph.
In 1961 ITRs were positively correlated with the importance of 'consumer
goods in inputs, but in 1967 they were positively associated with the shares of
investment goods. This change reflects the movement toward greater protec-
tion of investment goods in the 1960s (see section 5.2).
Table 12.1 contains partial-equilibrium time-series estimates of invest-
ment functions for six sectors. The underlying model assumes a response to
replacement needs and to changes in the desired capital stock. Relationship
12.1 presents a similar estimate for a residual category which includes con-





+ 0.216 MK_1 —3,885.QRFD + 3,609.
(1.9) (3.5) (3.5)
=0.84;SE =80.2;DW =2.4;years covered, 1950—65
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where
GDIRreal gross domestic investment in physical capital in the re-
sidual sectors;
GDPR =realGDP in the residual sectors;
R[PGDP]rate of growth of GDP deflator;
le DUMMY =dummyvariable for data definition problems in 1954 and
1959;
MKreal capital goods imports;
QRFDFfrench-Davis quantitative restrictions index.
Examinationof the results in Table 12.1 and in relationship 12.1 suggests
that on an over-all level the model is satisfactory. There is no evidence of Se-
rious problems of serial correlation, the coefficients generally have the a priori
anticipated signs (although in some cases the estimated lag structure includes
some unexpected signs, especially at endpoints), and the values for the cor-
ke rected coefficients of determination indicate that the specification is quite con-
sistent with variations in the dependent variable for utilities, agriculture, trans-
portation, and the residual sectors, but less so for industry and housing, and
least so for mining. The quite limited success in mining probably reflects the
7. specialcharacteristics of that sector mentioned above in subsections 4.2.1 and
7.1.2.3. The relatively limited success in housing probably also reflects the cx-
i. istence of special determinants in this sector and particularly serious problems
with the price indices for housing because of rent control.
Replacement investment is related to the level of real capacity and the
•—
stateof technology. Responses to replacement factors are significant in agri-
culture, industry, transportation, and the residual category. The foreign sector
I- does not affect replacement needs substantially, although it may have some
0 impact on the state of available technology.
p The desired capital stock depends on the neoclassical term derived from
I- the sectoral CES production functions in Behrman [1972c]. The strict neo-
classical term is modified by considerations relating to the degree of historical
capacity utilization and to uncertainty as represented by the standard deviation
of relative prices over three years.2° Responses to the neoclassical term are sig-
nificant in agriculture, mining, industry, utilities, and the residual category.
Capacity utilization is important in mining and housing. Uncertainty affects in-
vestment decisions in agriculture, mining, industry, and transportation. All
• three factors are directly affected by events in the foreign sector.
1. The price of investment goods in the neoclassical term depends heavily
on foreign prices and en the international economic regime because of the sub-
stantial importance of imports in the composition of investment. Increases in278 IMPACT OFFOREIGN-SECTOR REGIMES
TABLE12.1






































= coefficient of multiple determination adjusted for degrees of freedom.
SEstandard error of estimate.
DW = Durbin-Watson statistic.
a. The figures in parentheses are the absolute values of the tstatistics,each of which
is significantly nonzero at the 5 per cent level unless otherwise noted. The figures in
brackets are the lông-nm elasticities at the point of sample means.
b. The Hall-Sutch [1969] polynomial method with the tail constrained to zero is used
for replacement investment and for change in the desired capital stock variables; the
numbers in the column heads refer to the degree of the relevant polynomials. The implied
lag patterns are shown on the following page.
c. An elasticity of substitution of 0.31 was actually used, but in exploration of a
putty-clay type of hypothesis the neoclassical term was split into quantity and price com-
ponents. Since the coefficients of the latter were not significantly nonzero even at the 25
per cent level the price component was dropped. With only a quantity component the
model reduced to what it would be with an elasticity of substitution of zero.
d. Significantly nonzero at the 15 per cent level.
e. Significantly nonzero at the 10 per cent level.
f. Current value for 1960 and after; included because of change in data definition
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(3.1) (3.9) (1.9)(1.1)" (1.8)8.7
[0.71 [0.2] 2.9
6.21 —0.448 63.5 0.42
(2.7) (3.2) (8.6)33.0
1.4
3.94 0.224 —279.0 0.60
(1.6)' (1.4)' (1.9)75.0
[0.51 2.2
—10.9 2.76 0.0966 —700.0 0.92
(2.9)(3.3) (2.3) (2.2)42.0
[0.3] 2.4
0.06810.148' 0.0498 25.0 0.97






Lag (no. of years)
0 1 2 3
Agriculture
Replacement —0.0964 0.0147 0.0677 0.0629 0.0489
Neoclassical term 0.05 12 0.0384 0.0256 0.0128 0.128
Standard deviation —3.50 —2.63 —1.75 —0.875 —8.75
Mining
Neoclassical term —0.0248 0.0841 0.0762 0.0241 0.160
Capacityutilization265.0 94.2 —6.9 —38.3




Replacement 0.410 0.039 —0.153 —0.166
Neoclassical term 0.0 167 0.0039 —0.0054 —0.0079
0.129
0.0072
Standard deviation —15.8 —11.8 —7.89 —3.94 —39.4
Transportation
Replacement 0.378 0.282 0.188 0.094




Neoclassical term —0.0513 —0.0019 0.0848 0.116 0.148
Housing
Capacity utilization—258.0 251.0 532.0 557.0 1,132.0
I
-r — - '-Ir.
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the PLD-EER for investment goods or in the premium received by the im-
porters of such goods, therefore, significantly reduce real investment.
ii. The capacity-utilization term indirectly reflects foreign-sector policies.
In the short and medium term, aggregate capacity utilization tends to decline
with devaluations and reductions in restrictiveness (section 9.2). This nega-
tive short-mn effect of liberalization, thus, would have negative longer-run
consequences.
iii. Uncertainty about relative prices also tends to depress real investment.
Much of the variation in these prices originates in changing foreign-sector
policies. As noted above, the government has considered investment goods to
be postponable at times of foreign-exchange crises. The relative variance of
the PLD-EER(PI) for this category, therefore, exceeded that for all other
groups, with a negative effect on investment.
In addition to the terms for replacement and for change in the desired
stock of capital, the a priori specification of investment behavior includes two
other factors. The availability of government financial investment (largely
through CORFO) and the availability of imported machinery and equipment
both may affect the desired level of real capital stock or the speed of adjust-
ment toward the desired level.21 Mamalakis [1971b] in particular has empha-
sized the importance of the latter.
The results suggest that government direct and indirect investment has
significantly nonzero and rather substantial effects in the infrastructure sectors
of transportation, utilities, and housing, and in the goods-producing sectors of
agriculture and industry. The implied distribution of government
across sectors, with over-all emphasis mostly on industry but with increased
relative emphasis on infrastructure under Alessandri in the early 1960s, also
seems consistent with the historical patterns of such investment.
Imported investment goods and the OR index have significantly nonzero
coefficients for the residual sectors and for utilities and agriculture, but only at
the 15 per cent level for the last of these. The evidence for a strong direct im-
pact of the foreign sector on real physical capital investment in Chile through
imports, as hypothesized by Mamalakis, thus seems weak.22 The indirect effects
through the price system and through capacity-utilization rates apparently have
been more important.
Because of the existence of these indirect effects, the general-equilibrium
consequences of changes in the international economic regime for investment
• are of interest. The results of simulations 2.1.1 and 2.1.3 suggest that devalua-
tions have almost no net general-equilibrium investment impact (line 5.3.1 in
• Table A.!!). Responses to higher capital costs and lower utilization rates just
about neutralize possible inducements. The implication of simulation 2.3.1 is
that liberalization has a much more substantial effect, but the response changes
from positive in the short run to negative in the medium run.ECONOMIC GROWTH 281
Inconsideration of the investment response to both devaluation and lib-
eralization, the reservation stated in section 12.1 above must be repeated. Per-
haps expectations could be changed sufficiently so that this response would be
much greater than indicated by the historical data. Studies of other countries
may provide support for such a possibility. Unless such changes occurred, how-
ever, large positive investment responses to efforts at devaluation plus liberal-
ization should not be expected.
12.2.3.2SAViNGS.
The availability of resources for capital accumulation is determined by
f savings. If the government could costlessly use fiscal policy to alter savings
rates or if unlimited foreign savings were available, the amount of available
• domestic savings would not be a constraint on investment. Such conditions,
however, have not predominated in recent Chilean history. The impact of the
foreign sector on savings thus is of some interest.
U The available data permit the estimation of time-series savings-consump-
tion functions for households and nonprofit instjtutioflS,23 business, and the
government.Alternatives for each of these categories are presented in Table
12.2. The model utilized hypothesizes that savings-consumption decisions de-
pend basically on an appropriate income variable, with modifications due to a
number of factors discussed below.
The degree of consistency of the relations in Table 12.2 with variations in
f the dependent variables seems reasonably satisfactory nor are there any ap-
t parent problems of serial correlation. However, substantial multicollinearity
exists among a set of variables that includes per capita real mdnetary balances,
the black-market PLD-NER, the inverse of the GDP deflator, net foreign
savings, and the standard deviation of the PLD-EER. Therefore, in all three
-, cases alternatives are presented with various subsets of those values deleted:
t (i) the combination of variables that maximizes the degree of consistency with
the variance in the dependent variable; (ii) the combination that maximizes
the degree of consistency with the variance in the dependent variable subject
to the inclusion of real net foreign savings; and (iii) for households and non-
profit institutions, the combination for which the degree of consistency with the
variance in the dependent variable is almost as great as in the first alternative,
but in which per capita real monetary balances are included instead of the
t black-marketPLD-NER. The coefficient of the variables among which there
is multicollinearity must of course be interpreted with care.
The major determinant of real savings in each case is the net income
• variable: for households, real disposable income; for business, real after-tax
$ nonwageincome; and for government, real government revenues. The marginal
• savings propensities for these three groups vary substantially. After complete
adjustment,24 the point estimates range from 0.04 to 0.38 for households and
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TABLE 12.2
Real Consumption-Savings Functions for Chilean Households and Nonprofit
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Real per capita private consumption
I —0.623 2.24 —0.418
(6.5) (6.9) (6.2)
[0.6] [—0.0]
II —0.674 2.32 —0.439
(5.8) (5.4) (4.8)
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Agric. to R2 Rate
Foreign of In- Nonwage Total SE
Savings flation PLD-EERto Total GDP Constant DW
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
3.65 —61.9 508.0 —2,083.0 798.0 0.98
(3.7) (1.6)c (4.0) (4.0) (3.8) 18.5
[0.0] [—0.0] [0.1] [—0.2] 2.4
4.75 —72.0 512.0 —1,841.0 572.0 0.98
(3.6) (1.5)C (3.5) (3.0) (2.0) 20.9
[0.0] [—0.0] [0.1] [—0.1] 2.5
0.837' 2.0 790.0 —591.0 0.96
(4.3) (1.6)C (4.7) (I.1)e 26.9
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Notes to Table12.2
R'coefficient of multiple determination adjusted for degrees of freedom.
SE =standarderror of estimate.
DW Durbin-Watson statistic.
a. The figures in parentheses are the absolute values of the Istatistics,each of which
is significantly nonzero at the 5 per cent leveI unless otherwise noted. The figures in
brackets are the long-run elasticities at the point of sample means.
b. The Hall-Sutch [1969] polynomial method with the tail constrained to zero is
used for this variable. Zi (i =1or 2) is the order of the polynomial. The implied lag
patterns are as follows:
Lag (no. of years)
0 1 2 3
Real percapitaprivate consumption
IIncome 0.249 0.187 0.125 0.063 0.623
Rateofinflation —227.0 -44.5 53.9 68.8 —148.0
IIIncome 0.270 0.202 0.135 0.067 0.674
Rateof inflation—225.0 —37.4 62.9 75.4 —125.0
Monetary
balances 0.3651 0.2738 0.1826 0.093 0.9128
IIIIncome 0.385 0.288 0.192 0.096 0.961
Rate of inflation—183.0 —25.7 —57.0 65.6 —85.8
Real business savings: real cost of foreign exchange adjusted for import taxes
I —10.4 —7.80 —5.20 —2.60 —26.0
II —13.3 —42.9 9.3 23.6 —23.3
Real government consumption: real net foreign savings
III 0.065 0.250 0.153 0.004 0.465
c. Significantly nonzero at the 10 per cent level.
d. Estimates of per capita real savings of households and nonprofit institutions.
e. Significantly nonzero at the 15 per cent level.
nonprofit institutions, 0.55to0.63 for business, and 0.67 to 0.73 for the gov-
ernment.
Income shifts within the private sector from households to business
and income shifts from the private sector to the government, then, would tend
to increase real savings.25 As is discussed in subsection 11.2, overvaluation led
to the latter shift and thus increased total domestic savings in the short run.
Increased restrictiveness, however, tended to work in the opposite direction.26
For households and nonprofit institutions there is further evidence of a
distributional impact on savings. The data in columns 11 and 12 indicate that
shifts from nonwage to wage income and from the rest of the economy to agri-
culture would both increase savings. The former result in particular may be
somewhat surprising.27 If the inference is valid, the Chilean world is clearly not
Kaldorian, and savings could not be increased by shifting income away from
labor. In the short and medium run, these results imply that reducing quanti-
tative restrictions would increase savings by increasing both the labor and t
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agricultural shares. Devaluation, on the other hand, would have the counter-
acting effects of increasing the share of agriculture but reducing that of labor
(see sections 11.1 and 11.4).
For the private sector, real monetary balances in excess of desired levels
might induce expenditures and therefore reduce savings. Desired real balances
are not directly observable, but presumably depend on the level of after-tax
is real income and the cost of holding real balances. The major component of
this cost is the expected rate of inflation.28
Under the assumption that the expected rate of inflation might be repre-
sented by a distributed lag of past price changes or by a distributed lag of
PLD-EERs, the estimates in Table 12.2 provide some support for the view that
the role of excess real monetary balances in the savings process is inverse. Con-
sistent with this hypothesis, for both households and business the point esti-
mates imply an elastic inverse response of savings to the level of actual bal-
ances, an inverse response to price expectations as represented by patterns of
PLD-EERs, and a positive response to after-tax real income.29 On net, as is
28 suggested in subsection 9.1.3, both devaluation and increased restrictiveness
would reduce savings by increasing real balances.
The positive sign for the response of household saving to the distributed
lag of the rate of change of prices, in contrast, is not consistent with the real-
balance hypothesis. However, the sign of this response probably only reflects
the relative inability of households to defend their share of command over
goods in the face of high inflation rates. Thus they end up with some forced
savings.
Weisskopf [1972], among others, has hypothesized that foreign savings
are at least partially substituted for domestic savings (Papanek [1972, 1973]
— presentsa critique of this view)Thelast alternative for each of the three
groups provides some support for this hypothesis. In one sense, in fact, the
v- support is too strong because the total of the relevant coefficients implies that a
ss permanent increase in real net foreign savings of one unit ceteris paribus results
in a decrease in real net domestic savings of at least the same order of magni-
tude. If it were not for the problem of multicollinearity, therefore, one might
n. conclude that in the Chilean case there is support for a rather extreme version
26 ofthe hypothesis. However, given that the relevant coefficient estimates for the
a real private domestic savings functions are probably biased upward in absolute
at value because part of the effects of price and possibly of real monetary balances
ti- are incorporated, any deduction about at least the size of the substitution must
be be qualified. Nevertheless, the conclusion seems warranted that the impact of
net real foreign savings on Chilean real domestic savings may be quite
significant.
Ii- There is some evidence of statistically significant responses for uncer-
tainty, which is the final determinant of real savings behavior.31 For household286 IMPACT OF FOREIGN-SECTOR REGIMES
savings the point estimates suggest an inverse response to increased uncertainty
about inflation but a direct response to increased uncertainty about PLD-EERs.
Neither of these effects, however, is very large.
All the evidence of the impact of the foreign sector on domestic savings
discussed up to this point is based on partial-equilibrium analysis. The model
of Chapter 2 again provides insight into what happens within a general-
equilibrium context. In respect to savings there is no trade-off on the aggregate
level between the effects of devaluation and of liberalization. For both actions,
the net aggregate consequence of all the reactions discussed above is to increase
savings (line 5.2 for simulations 2.1.1 and 2.3.1 in Table A. 11). To the extent
that savings have been a constraint on growth, therefore, the prevalent inter-
national economic regimesofrecentdecades have reducedeconomic
• expansion.32
12.2.4Quality of Capital.
It can be hypothesized that in a number of respects international economic
regimes affect the quality of capital—.--or at least what appears to be the quality
of capital—as it would be specified in an aggregate production function. Com-
prehensive evidence bearing on this hypothesis often is hard to come by. Some
fragments of evidence, however, are available.
• i. The aggregate marginal capital-output ratio reflects counteracting ten-
dencies related to the effects of foreign-sector policies. First, the ratios reflect.
the degree of capacity utilization. Utilization rates might decline with greater
restrictiveness because of shortages of key imported inputs. It is suggested in
section 9.2, however, that liberalization and devaluation cause a net reduction
in these rates because of competition from imports and a number of indirect
effects.
The ratios also reflect the size of inventories. Under restrictive regimes,
desired inventories would be higher, ceteris paribus, because of the need to
hedge against future supply shortages. At the same time, however, actual in-
ventories might be lower because of limited past and current supplies.
In addition, changes in the geographic sources of investment goods are
reflected in the ratios. If restrictions limit capital goods imports, the origin of
investment goods may shift toward domestic sources (especially in the case of
construction materials).33 The mean ratios of imported investment goods to
total investment provides some support for this view (line 1.2.1.2 in Table A. 1).
Finally, the foreign-sector regime also might alter the aggregate capital-
output ratio through changes in the allocation of investment by destination
among production sectors with different capital intensities. In subsection
12.2.3.1, above, in fact, evidence is reported of more restrictive regimes leading
to greater investment in more capital-intensive subsectors.ECONOMICGROWTH 287
The net effect of all these considerations on the aggregate marginal capital-
aty output ratio was to lower it in the more liberal phases (line 5.5 in Table A.1).
Rs. The lowest mean value of this ratio in the post-World War II period was for
the 1965—70 Phase III years, followed by the 1956—58 Phase III years, and
cigs the 1959—61 Phase IV years.34 In this sense, therefore, liberalization was asso-
del ciated with greater quality of capital. In fact, however, this aspect of quality
ui- primarily reflects capacity-utilization rates and different dimensions of compO-
;ate sitional change.
,I1S, ii.Imported capital equipment generally is higher in quality than are
ace domestically produced goods because of the limited development of Chilean
ent industries producing machinery and equipment.35 It is emphasized in subsectors
ter- 6.1.2 and 12.2.3.1 that liberalization generally increased the availability of
imported capital equipment. It thus also increased the quality of Chilean
capital.
iii. At times, under more restrictive Chilean international economic re-
gimes, the importation of second-hand machinery and equipment was pro-
hibited in order to limit capital flight through overinvoicing. In many instances
mc such equipment might have been economically more efficient than new goods.36
lity iv. If the protective structure created by the international economic
regime were positively associated with DRCs, it might be concluded that capital
me and other factors were allocated inefficiently. In the aggregate this would be
the same as a lower quality of capital. In Table A.4, there is some evidence
en- that the higher-DRC subsectors in 1961 had higher ITRs and EPRs.
ect These bits of evidence, thus, all seem to point in the same direction. The
iter degree of restrictiveness has been inversely associated with the aggregate
Ifl "quality" of capital. In this respect the prevalent restrictive nature of recent
(Ofl Chilean foreign-sector policies have had a cost in terms of growth.
ect
es, 12.2.5Quantity of Nah.ral Resources.
Foreign-sector policy affects the effective quantity of natural resources as
ifl specified in an aggregate production function in two important respects. First,
some important raw materials, e.g., petroleum, must be imported at least in
part. Second, most of Chile's mineral wealth is in fact wealth only if it can be
of exported. Chileans could not have utilized more than a small fraction of the
of nitrates mined between 1870 and 1930 or of the copper mined since 1920.
to In subsections 6.1.2 and 7.1.2.3 it is suggested that the contribution of
I). natural resources in either of these respects has tended to be greater the more
- liberalthe regime. However, in more restrictive periods natural resource im-
tun ports have been relatively unconstrained. Moreover, the division of returns
from mining exports was less advantageous to Chile than it might have been in
• certain more liberal periods (see section 1.2 and subsections 4.2.1 and 8.1.1).288 IMPACT OF FOREIGN-SECTOR REGIMES
12.2.6Quantity of Foreign Factors.
If substitution is very low between some imports and domestic factors,
command over foreign-exchange resources is itself a separate input in the ag-
gregate production function.37 Sources of foreign exchange include exports of
goods and services and net capital inflows. For a given level of foreign ex-
change the government also can attempt to shape its composition so that critical
needs are serviced first.
In chapters 3 through 8, the impact of Chilean international economic
regimes on the command over foreign-exchange resources is considered in great
detail. To be sure, in the short run the more restrictive regimes generally have
allowed continued inflows of foreign inputs despite very limited foreign-
exchange resources. However, at such times, they generally have discriminated
strongly against capital-goods inputs. Moreover, they have increased the long-
run vulnerability of the economy to such crises by discouraging expansion of
exports. From this point of view, the net effect of the general atmosphere of
restrictiveness on growth has probably been negative.
12.2.7Miscellaneous Sources of Growth.
The literature on development emphasizes a number of other sources of
growth: research and development leading to improvements in the quality of
labor or the quality of capital, or both, economies of scale, motivation (N-
achievement), linkage effects,externalities, infrastructure development, to
name a few.
For most of these factors it is extremely difficult to obtain data that per-
mits satisfactory testing of the relation between their contribution to growth
and foreign-sector policies. In at least two cases, however, these policies prob-
ably have had detrimental effects: (i) They have discouraged linkages between
the export sector and the rest of the economy. The NER policy
for large-scale mining, for example, strongly discouraged the use of domestic
labor and other inputs (see sections 3.2 and 11.1 and subsections 4.2.1, 5.1.2,
and 7.2.1). (ii) They have encouraged the development of plants at far below
optimal scale. In the early 1 960s, for example, eleven different plants were in-
volved in the manufacture of fewer than 4,000 automobiles per year.
NOTES
1. Because of lags in data availability, only 1971 is included for the Allende period.
The high growth rate in that year was due more to increased capacity utilization than
to growth. In fact, total real investment fell 7.7 per cent and imports of machinery and
equipment fell 16.8 per cent.
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2.For the 1965—70 period, however, much of this growth was in the first two
years, before the acceleration of liberalization attempts. In 1967 and 1970 per capita
product declined, and in 1968 and 1969 it increased moderately.
* 3.For example, see Edel [1969:86], Instituto de EconomIa [1963:75] and Ffrench-
Davis [1971:245]. Sierra [1969:64] is an exception. He criticizes the stabilization program
from a structuralist viewpoint, but concludes that growth occurred. On the other hand,
Mamalakis [1971b: 164] generally opposes the structuralist analysis, but agrees that 1956—
58 was a quite stagnant period.
4. The significantly nonzero correlation coefficients for the 1968 export-oriented
measures are not discussed here because of doubts about how well the over-all sub-
sectoral characteristics relate to the few products within each subsector for which these
ft ITRs, EPRs, and DRCs are constructed.
S. For references to discussions of the theoretical reasons why EPRs would not be
expected to be related to relative growth see Appendix B.
• 6. This qualification is much more important for growth concerns than for others
because the gestation period is relatively long for many changes related to growth.
7. The wage share has averaged at least 60 per cent in recent phases (line 4.2 in
L TableA.1).
8. In the long run there might also be an impact on population. If population
• responds, GDP per capita probably is a better indicator of the degree of success in attain-
ing growth-related goals than is total GDP.
9. Under the assumption of sectoral CES production functions with constant returns
to scale, the marginal product of labor (MPL) is related to the average product of labor
(APL) as follows: MPL =(b whereis the elasticity of substitution and b
depends on the state of the technology and other parameters of the production function.
On the basis of estimates of the sectoral elasticities of substitution and other relevant
parameters presented for agriculture, mining, and industry in Behrman [1972a1 marginal
labor productivity was highest for mining, followed by industry and agriculture. This
calculation must be viewed with a certain amount of caution, however, since it depends
on the magnitude of the constant term in the original estimates.
10. No significantly positive correlation coefficients were found, moreover, be-
— tweenrates of protection and labor productivity levels or changes (Table A.5).
11. That the correlation is high is not obvious. Many individuals in the lowest
income class may be made worse off by measures which benefit organized labor and
increase only its share.
12. In the Chilean case, for example, see Behrman [1972c and 1973b] and Harberger
and Selowsky [1966].
13. Most of the nonlabor share of product (i.e., 1.0 minus line 4.2 in Table A.1) is
W the capital share.
1- 14. This proportion is in domestic prices. As is discussed below, the share of invest-
ment is higher in terms of world prices. Comparable data for the pre-war period are not
available. According to ECLA estimates reported by Mamalakis [1971b: 121] the share
of investment in national product fell from 20 per cent for 1925—30 to 4 per cent in
• 1933 and then rose to 10—15 per cent in 1935—40. The direction of changes in this pat-
tern seems reasonable, but it is doubtful that the share of investment for 1935—40 averaged
above the means for postwar periods. In particular, the decline in GDP per capita in
the 1930s in contrast to increases on the average after the war create doubts about the
level of the ECLA proportions relative to those in the national accounts (lines 3.1.2.2
and 5.1 in Table A.!).
15. In Table A.2, the secular exponential growth rates in 1940—65 are 3.8 per cent290 IMPACTOF FOREIGN-SECTOR REGIMES
for GDP and 6.0 per cent for investment. The discrepancy between these two rates,
however, is misleading for the post-World War II period because of the very low share
of investment in GDP during the war (line 3.1.2.2 in Table A.1).
16. A slight decline in the growth rate of investment for the first year of each of
the three liberalization attempts, however, is significant in Table A.2. This fall is em-
phasized by critics of these efforts. During the most liberalized episode, moreover,
Hirschman [1963:219] claims that investment sagged further in the second year (i.e.,
1960), laying open the government to further criticisms from the left and from the
structuralists. But the national accounts indicate there was a record 29.5 per cent increase
in real investment in 1960.
17. CORFO also helped to establish a favorable investment climate, focused atten-
tion on the importance of imported machinery and equipment, made possible more sys-
tematic analysis of the Chilean economy by its data collection and processing efforts,
probably increased foreign capital inflows, and made possible large-scale investment
projects under Chilean control. This activity was somewhat phase related. Mamalakis
[197 lb:565—587J suggests, however, that it may have in large part resulted more in a
shift in investment than a net addition because of other scarcities(e.g., skilled labor
and foreign exchange) and because of deterioration in the capital market due in part to
deficit financing of CORFO.
18. Based on line 3.1.2.2 in Table A.l and the mean value of 0.64 for the ratio
of PLD-EER(PI)s of investment to consumption goods in column 4 of Table 5.2.
19. Correlations with ITR3 and EPR4 are not included in the discussion because
they are for subsectoral exports only and are not representative of the entire subsector.
20. The first component of the desired capital stock is in putty-putty form in that
the response to expected price and quantity terms is symmetric. For an examination of
the relative merits of the putty-putty and putty-clay hypotheses in the Chilean context
see Behrman [1972b].
21. However, some preliminary nonlinear maximum-likelihood estimates in which
these considerations are hypothesized to affect the adjustment processes directly are not
very promising.
22. The evidence seems surprisingly weak given that the sectoral investment series
are based in part on data for imported investment goods. Investment in mining, of course,
has depended much more directly on the foreign sector than investment in other produc-
tion sectors. See subsections 4.2.1, 7.1.2.3, and 8.2.1.
23. For households and nonprofit institutions, the national accounts indicate a
negative savings rate for every year from 1960 to 1971. This characteristic presumably
is more an artifact due to the residual nature of savings and a systematic overvaluation
of depreciation than a reflection of reality. The estimates below are made under the
assumption that such a measurement error is independent of the included variables. For
further discussion of the negative savings estimates in the Chilean accounts, see Mama-
lalds [1967b1 and ODEPLAN [1970a].
24. For households there is an adjustment for permanent income. For the first
year, the point estimates of the marginal propensity to save for households range from
0.61 to 0.75. Therefore, they are as high as for any other group if only the immediate
impact is considered. This range also implies that impact multipliers are not very large
because of the considerable leakage into savings.
25. Under Allende, however, it is not clear that the government remained a relatively
high marginal saver. In 1971, for example, real savings fell (and became negative, in
fact), although real revenues rose.
26. Unless the marginal propensity to save out of the import premiums was as highECONOMIC GROWTH 291
asthe marginal propensity to save of the government, these results overstate the gain in
savings from restrictiveness because the aggregation obscures the effect of changes in
the premiums.
27. This result may reflect the use here of a very broad definition of labor, i.e.,
returns to self-employed proprietors are included in the wage share.
28. Real interest rates a priori would seem to be much less important because of
their small magnitude in comparison to expected inflation. No statistical evidence of
their significance could be found.
29. The effect of real income on desired real balances, however, cannot be dis-
entangled from its direct impact on savings.
30. The two-gap model posits a different relation between domestic and foreign
savings. Because of a lack of foreign exchange, savings may be frustrated at the margin.
• 31.Actually Table 12.2 also includes the inverse of the GDP deflator (column 6).
This variable is included because the functions were originally specified in nominal terms,
but then deflated in order to lessen multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity.
32. One point that is not touched upon in this subsection is that in sheltered foreign
markets added savings might be induced for financing attractive investment. Evidence for
b exploring this possibility is very difficult to obtain. In a related vein, however, Mamalakis
[1971b:565—587J claims that CORFO investment largely replaced rather than supple-
mented other investment due to shortages of skilled labor and foreign exchange and the
deterioration of local capital markets once inflation became high. The more important
the shortages of other factors, the less likely it is that restrictive regimes induced addi-
tional savings through this mechanism.
-t 33. In the 1956—58 liberalization, for example, housing investment fell an average
of 21 per cent per year. This drop partially reflected tight credit conditions, but also was
* due to the end of a building boom in the previous phase that had been inspired by near
hyperinflation and very severe restrictions on imports.
34. Several qualifications should be kept in mind: First, the mean for the 1952—55
t Phase II subperiod was not significantly higher than that for 1959—61. Secondly, the
absence of data precludes inclusion of the Allende years during which time the aggregate
marginal capital-output ratio probably was very low owing to the high utilization ratio
• and very limited investment. Finally, and for the same reasons, the mean during the
Second World War was relatively low.
35. If production possibilities ex ante have fixed coefficients and the factor propor-
tions associated with imported equipment differ strongly from those domestically available,
in a very important sense imported capital may not be of "high quality." This possibility
does not seem to have offset other quality advantages of imported capital goods in the
Chilean experience.
r 36. The most outstanding single example of distortions introduced by the prohibition
of second-hand inputs, however, may have been for automobiles. See subsection 10.1.2
for a brief description of this subsector.
37. The two-gap model usually is based on the extreme assumption of no sub-
stitutibility between domestic and foreign inputs. For a critique of this model and
references to some of its most prominent uses, see Behrrnan fl97Ib].
'I